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CONSTITUTIONAL
WHICH WITHHOLDS

LAW-EQUAL

PROTECTION-A
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ALIEN CHILDREN AND PERMITS LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO DENY
ENROLLMENT TO SUCH CHILDREN DoEs NOT FURTHER A
SUBSTANTIAL STATE INTEREST AND THEREFORE VIOLATES
THE EQUAL PROTECTION

CLAUSE OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Plyler v. Doe (U.S. 1982)
In 1975, the Texas legislature amended its education laws to withhold from local school districts state funds for the education of children
who were not legally admitted into the United States.' This amendment also authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in the
public schools to such children.2 On July 21, 1977, acting pursuant to
the revised education statute, the Board of Trustees of the Tyler Inde1.Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1982). Section 21.031 of the Texas
Educational Code provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally
admitted aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the
age of 21 years on the first day of September of any scholastic year
shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund that
year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or
a legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not
over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in
which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public
free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent,
guardian or the person having lawful control of him resides at the
time he applies for admission.
TEX. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1975). Before its amendment in 1975,
§ 21.031 provided for state funding and free admission to public schools for
all children. Id. (prior to amendment). Texas is the only state which has a
statute designed to deny illegal alien or "undocumented" children free public
education. Wall St. J., June 16, 1982, at 24, col. 2. Children who are not
legally admitted into the country are referred to as "undocumented children"
because they have neither official documentation of their legal presence in this
country, nor any prospects of successfully securing such documentation. See
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1980), aft'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
2. Section 21.031(c) of the Texas Educational Code provides as follows:
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this
state shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of
tuition all persons who are either citizens of the United States or
legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not over 21 years
of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his
parent, guardian, or person having lawful control resides within the
school district.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.03 1(c) (Vernon 1975).

(198)
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pendent School District (Tyler ISD) s adopted a policy that prevented
"undocumented children" from attending Tyler public schools unless
4
they paid a tuition of $1,000.
On September 6, 1977, a class action was brought against the Tyler
ISD Board of Trustees 5 on behalf of a number of undocumented
children of Mexican origin.6 The illegal alien children plaintiffs claimed
that the Texas statute 7 violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.8 They sought
to permanently enjoin 9 the School Board from requiring the payment
of tuition by undocumented children as a precondition to their enroll3. See 458 F. Supp. at 574. Tyler ISD is a public school district located
in the northeastern part of Texas and is managed by a Board of Trustees. Id.
4. Id. Despite the amendment of §21.031 in 1975, the Tyler lSD continued to enroll undocumented children free of charge, until the 1977-78 school
year. Id. at 571-72. As of 1977, approximately 60 out of a total enrollment
of 16,000 children were undocumented. Id. at 577. The Tyler ISD, noting an
increase in the number of "undocumented children" enrolling in its schools,
expressed its fear that Tyler would become a "haven" for illegal aliens. Id.
at 572. The Board's policy provided for enrollment of "all qualified students
who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens, and who are
residents of this school district, free of tuition charge." Illegal alien children
could enroll only "by payment of the full tuition fee." Id. at 572.
5. Id. at 571-72. Suit was brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, under which the plaintiffs must establish that the defendant's
actions were done under color of state law, and that these actions deprived
the plaintiffs of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
6. 458 F. Supp. at 571 n.l. The effect of the amended statute was a
denial of education, for none of the named plaintiff illegal alien children were
able to produce documentation of legal status, and none of their parents could
afford to pay the $1,000 tuition. Id. at 574-75. Suit was brought in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Id. at 572.
The minor plaintiffs were represented by their parents as guardians ad litem.
Id. at 571 n.l. On September 9, 1977, the State of Texas' oral motion to
intervene as a party defendant was granted. Id. at 572. Before trial, the
court ordered that the action be maintained as a class action on behalf of all
"undocumented school-aged children of Mexican origin residing within the
Tyler I.S.D." Id. at 571 n.1.
7. TEx. Enuc. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1975). For the text of the
Texas statute, see notes 1-2 supra.
8. 458 F. Supp. at 572. The plaintiffs claimed that the Texas statute
violated their equal protection rights by denying them the free public education accorded to other children. For the text of the fourteenth amendment,
see note 16 infra. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Texas statute was preempted by the federal Immigration and Nationality Act. 458 F. Supp. at 572
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970)).
9. 458 F. Supp. at 571. Injunctive relief was sought pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1978). The plaintiffs filed
a motion for a preliminary injunction with their complaint. 458 F. Supp. at
572. The court granted the request for preliminary relief, finding that the
plaintiffs had shown a probability of success on the merits of the equal protection issue, and that they would suffer irreparable harm if interim relief
were denied. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss1/7

2

Gallagher: Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - A Texas Statute Which Wit
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 28:

p. 198

ment in public schools.' 0 The defendants argued in response that the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection did not extend
to illegal aliens," and, alternatively, that even if it did, the statute
constituted economic and social regulation, reviewable only under the
most deferential level of equal protection scrutiny. 12 The district court
granted the injunction, holding that the equal protection clause applied
to illegal aliens and that the Texas statute was a violation of that
clause.' 3 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
14
Circuit affirmed on the equal protection issue.
10. For a discussion of this requirement, see notes 3-4 and accompanying
text supra.

11. 458 F. Supp. at 579.
12. Id. The defendants argued that §21.031 should be reviewed under
the deferential rational basis test. Id. For a discussion of the rational basis
test, see notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra. The defendants maintained
that the purpose of the statute was to enable school districts to use public
educational funds "to provide high quality education for United States citizens
and lawful residents, instead of sharing it with people who have no right to
be in the state at all." 458 F. Supp. at 579. Additionally, they argued, the
statute was designed to protect local educational funds should there be an
influx of illegal aliens into Tyler. Id. at 575. As such, the defendants maintained, § 21.031 "easily satisfie[d] the long-established rational basis test." Id.
at 579.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the state argued further that § 21.031 was
justified because no "significant gain" would be derived from educating these
children to offset the "decrease in the quality of education for citizens and
legal aliens," and because of concern that illegal alien children would spread
diseases among the other children. 628 F.2d at 460.
13. 458 F. Supp. at 593. The district court daracterized the statute as.
imposing a total deprivation of education. Id. at 580. Noting that the
Supreme Court had not articulated the appropriate standard of review in such
a case, the court determined that the following four elements nevertheless
occasioned "a close examination" of § 21.031: 1) the benefit denied was education; 2) charging tuition to undocumented children constituted wealth discrimination; 3) the statute penalized children who were without fault; and
4) illegal aliens may be considered a suspect class when a "state acts independently of the federal exclusionary purposes, accepts the presence of theillegal aliens, and then subjects them to discriminatory laws." See id. at
580-84. Despite this "close examination" by the district court, it nevertheless
found it unnecessary to invalidate the law on that basis "since it appear[ed]
that defendants have not demonstrated a rational basis for the state law or the
local school policy." Id. at 585.
In addition the district court held that § 21.031 was preempted by federal
law, since it "defeats the clear implications of federal laws covering both
illegal aliens and [the] education of disadvantaged children." Id. at 592.
First, the court found that the federal government had little interest in
imposing punitive measures on illegal aliens, other than as a deterrent.
Secondly, the court stated that a denial of education would be "among the
additional penalties Congress would be least likely to tolerate." Id.
14. 628 F.2d at 454-61. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court
that illegal aliens were entitled to the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 454.
This court also found no need to determine what standard of review to apply
to § 21.031, since it found the statute failed even to meet the "mere rational
basis standard." Id. at 458. In addition to rejecting the state's fiscal conservation and deference to the legislature arguments, the circuit court also,
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The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, holding that a
state statute that withholds state funds for the education of illegal alien
children and permits local school districts to deny enrollment to such
children does not further a substantial state interest and therefore violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Plyler
v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 16 The Supreme Court has held that this

rejected the arguments that § 21.031 was justified because educating illegal
aliens would not result in a gain to the state and that illegal alien children
would contaminate other school children with communicable diseases. Id. at
460.
However, the circuit court reversed the district court on the preemption
issue finding that § 21.031 did not conflict with any federal policy. Id. at
451-54.
15. Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion and was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell each filed a concurring opinion as well. Chief Justice
Burger filed a dissent in which Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
joined.
Plyler v. Doe was heard by the Court in conjunction with Texas v. Certain
Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children. 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
The companion case challenged the constitutionality of the same revised Texas
statute and was a consolidation of various suits brought in the United States
District Courts for the Southern, Western, and Northern Districts of Texas,
during the years 1978 and 1979. Id. at 2390-91. In July of 1980, the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that § 21.031 violated the equal
protection clause. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980). The district court in
this case reviewed § 21.031 under heightened scrutiny, stating "the absolute
deprivation of education should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly
when the absolute deprivation is the result of [a] complete inability to pay
for the desired benefit." Id. at 582. In holding that the statute failed to pass
this review, the district court rejected the state's concern for fiscal integrity,
stated there was no showing that the exclusion of illegal alien children was
necessary to improve education in the state, and held that there was no showing
that § 21.031 actually furthered any state interest. Id. at 582-83. Prior to,
hearing the appeal from this decision, the Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Plyler,
affirmed the invalidation of § 21.031 on equal protection grounds. 628 F.2d
448 (5th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Doe v.
Plyler, see note 14 supra. Relying on that opinion, the Court of Appeals
summarily affirmed the district court's ruling and the Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases. 102 S. Ct. at 2390.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment:
provides ag follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
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protection extends to legal aliens as well as citizens.17 While the equal
protection clause does not require that all state laws apply equally to
all persons, it does require that persons similarly situated be treated in

a similar manner.1 s In pursuing this requirement of equal protection

of the laws, the Supreme Court has applied three levels of review in
ruling on the validity of challenged statutes.' 9

These are the rational

17. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

The Graham

Court stated,
It has long been settled, and it is not disputed here, that the term

"person" in this context encompasses lawfully admitted resident
aliens as well as citizens of the United States and entitles both citizens
and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which
they reside.
Id. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (fourteenth amendment applies "to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality").
The term "person" in the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, has been interpreted by the Court as guaranteeing due process
of law to both legal and illegal aliens. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976) (due process clause of fifth and fourteenth amendments apply even to
those whose presence in the United States is unlawful, involuntary or transitory); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (legal and illegal aliens may
not be expelled without due process). See generally Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1080

(1979).
18. Compare Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (things different in
fact need not be treated in law as though the same) with F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) ("classification[s] must be reasonable ...
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation").
19. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (rational
basis test); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (strict scrutiny); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny). For a discussion of these
three standards, see generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 670-971 (10th
ed. 1980 &cSupp. 1982); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 522-687 (1978 &c
Supp. 1982); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
994-1136 (1978 &cSupp. 1982); Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S.CAL. L. REV. 689 (1977); Fox,
Equal Protection Analysis: Lawrence Tribe, the Middle Tier, and the Role
of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 525 (1980); Gunther, The Supreme Court-1971
Term, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Gunther, Newer Equal Protection]; Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Developments in the Law]; Comment, Federalism and a New Equal Protection,
24 VILL. L. REV. 557 (1979). Not all of the present justices have agreed that
there are three levels of review. In the past, Justices Burger, Rehnquist and
White acknowledged only two tiers of review: rational basis and strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970). But see Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 465 (1981) ("traditional minimum rationality takes on a
somewhat 'sharper focus' when gender-based classifications are challenged")
(plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist).

Justice Marshall has asserted that

the Court really uses a "sliding scale" approach. See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
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basis test,20 strict scrutiny,2 ' and so-called intermediate scrutiny. 22 The
initial, and perhaps determinative question in an equal protection case
is the standard of review to be applied; this depends upon the class of
persons involved and the interests affected by the legislation at issue.2
When a challenged statute or regulation is not based upon a "suspect" classification,24 and does not affect "fundamental rights," 25 but
only "economic" interests, 2 the Court employs the rational basis test.
The rational basis test, the most deferential standard of review, affords
the challenged legislation a presumption of constitutionality 27 and requires only that the law have a legitimate purpose 28 and a rational
relationship to the fulfillment of that purpose.2
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of Justice Marshall's "sliding scale," see note 39 infra.
20. For a discussion of the rational basis test, see notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
21. For a discussion of strict scrutiny review, see notes 30-35 and accompanying text infra.
22. For a discussion of "middle-tier," intermediate scrutiny, see notes 56-66
and accompanying text infra.
23. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 530, 335 (1972). See generally
Bice, supra note 19, at 693-702; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA 8 J. YOUNG, supra note
19, at 524.
24. For a discussion of suspect classifications, see note 34 infra.
25. For a discussion of fundamental rights or interests, see note 33 infra.
26. Interests that are considered economic interests, and which are thus
evaluated according to the rational basis standard, include the right to engage
in a profession and the right to sell merchandise. See New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976) (sell merchandise); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (sell merchandise); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(profession).
27. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
For a
further discussion of the rational basis test, see note 29 infra.
28. For a discussion of legitimate purposes, see generally Bennett, Mere

Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1077-88 (1979).

29. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (deference
given to legislators in choosing means; only requirement is that the means
chosen be a rational way to achieve aim). The rational basis test is the most
deferential form of review given by the Court in equal protection analysis.
See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG supra note 19, at 524. The
Court will not require the legislative body to articulate the purposes behind
the legislation; the Court will be satisfied if it can hypothesize a legitimate
purpose. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
179 (1980); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960). Under the rational
basis test, "[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).

It has been suggested that there are actually two strands of rational basis
review: one involving almost no review, the Williamson v. Lee Optical
standard, and one involving somewhat more, or "rational basis with bite."
See Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, supra note 19, at 18-20. Justice
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In contrast, the most stringent standard of review, strict scrutiny,
carries with it a presumption of unconstitutionality s0 and requires that
the challenged legislation be carefully tailored, neither overinclusive nor
underinclusive,3l and necessary to the achievement of a compelling state
interest. 2 Strict scrutiny is applied to classifications which affect a
"fundamental right" or "interest," 83 or which are based upon a "suspect"
Brennan has criticized the Court for its application of the rational basis test,
claiming that in effect it "virtually immunizes social and economic legislative
classifications from judicial review." United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his view the
rational basis test "is not a toothless one, . . . and will not be satisfied by
flimsy or implausible justifications for the legislative classification, proferred
after the fact by Government attorneys." Id. at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
One commentator has suggested that the new bite in the rational basis test
may be the result of discontent with the rigid two-tiered standard of review
adhered to by some of the justices, and its accompanying predictable outcomes.
See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 671-74; Gunther,
Newer Equal Protection, supra note 19, at 17-18. As a result, there is more of
a demand that the classification further legitimate purposes, and there have
been sporadic hints that the Court might require legislatures to articulate the
purposes underlying the law. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 674 n.8.
See also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). In McGinnis, Justice
Powell, speaking for the Court, asked "whether the challenged distinction
rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose." Id. at 270
(emphasis added). In reversing the invalidation of a New York law which
denied certain prisoners "good-time" credit toward parole for time spent in
presentence confinement, Justice Powell claimed the Court had "supplied no
imaginary basis or purpose for this statutory scheme." Id. at 277. But see
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (no requirement
that legislature articulate its purposes).
30. See Comment, supra note 19, at 560 n.18. As a result of this presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the state. Id.
31. Legislation is overinclusive when it affects a group larger than that
which is necessary to achieve its purpose. See Tussman and tenBroek, supra
note 19 at 351. It follows that for such legislation there would be a less
detrimental alternative means of achieving the desired purpose. Id. at 351-52.
Legislation is underinclusive when it affects a group smaller than that which
is necessary to achieve its purpose. Id. at 348. For a discussion of the overinclusive and underinclusive concepts in equal protection analysis, and of the
relationship between legislative classifications and their purpose, see Tussman
and tenBroek, supra note 19, at 344-353.
32. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ("pressing public necessity" for "protection
against espionage and sabotage" is compelling state interest) and Marston v.
Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Burns v. Forston, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (state's
"important interest in accurate vote lists" served by statute which infringed on
interstate migration) with Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (fiscal savings and administrative concerns insufficient state
interests to justify infringement of fundamental right to interstate travel).
33. See Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, supra note 19, at 8. Various
rights have been recognized by the Court as fundamental in the equal protection context. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
(first amendment rights); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to
participate in elections); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to
interstate travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (right to the free
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classification,3 4 such as race or national origin.5 5 The Supreme Court's
prior decisions offer some guidance on whether classifications based
upon alienage, or affecting education, are deserving of strict scrutiny.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 6 the
Court declined the opportunity to treat education as a fundamental
exercise of religion); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 US. 516 (1960) (right
of association); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to a criminal
appeal); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreation). The
terms fundamental rights and fundamental interests were used interchangeably by the Warren Court, which extended strict scrutiny review to interests
for which there was no express constitutional provision. See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote in local elections);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote in state
elections); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to appeal criminal conviction). See generally Bice, supra note 19, at 695-97. However the present
Court has made it clear that it will limit the fundamental rights brand of
strict scrutiny in equal protection analysis to those rights which are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). For a further discussion
of Rodriguez, see notes 36-39 and accompanying text infra. Prior to Rodriguez, the Court had given hints that the list of fundamental rights was not
going to grow. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing not
a fundamental interest); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (allocations of welfare benefits not subject to strict scrutiny). Gunther refers to this
as the "thus far and no further" approach of the Burger Court. See Gunther,
Newer Equal Protection, supra note 19, at 12-16.
34. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The term
"suspect" originated in Korematsu, in which the Court stated that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect." Id. at 216. The strict treatment given by the Court to suspect
classifications has its foundations in footnote 4 of Justice Stone's majority
opinion in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938). In Carolene Products, the Court deferred to Congress, and upheld a
federal prohibition against the interstate shipment of "filled milk," under the
rational basis test. Id. at 154. However, Justice Stone was careful to point
out that, in determining the proper scope of judicial intervention in this
case, the Court had no need to inquire inter alia "whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 154 n.4 (emphasis added). See gen-

erally G.

GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

supra note 19, at 541-43.

Classifications deemed suspect are generally "irrelevant to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). That
is, a distinction based upon race, bears no relation towards the elimination
of any mischief, whose elimination would be permitted under the Constitution. Various legislative classifications have been held to be suspect. Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ancestry). The
Court has also held various classifications not to be suspect. Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth).
35. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin).
36. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Rodriguez involved a challenge to the Texas system
of financing public education primarily through local property taxes, and the
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right because it found that education was not "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." 7 The Court therefore reviewed this
classification under the deferential standard of "whether it rationally
further[ed] some legitimate, articulated state purpose." 38 The Rodriguez
Court, however, noted that it was not faced with an absolute denial of
education, but rather with alleged relative differences in the quality of
education among Texas school districts.3 9
resultant disparity of school funds in each district depending on local property
wealth. Id. at 4-17. Plaintiffs argued that the Court should subject these
laws to strict scrutiny because they affected education, a fundamental interest,
and were based on wealth, a suspect classification. Id. at 17.
37. Id. at 33-34 . However, on various occasions the Court has emphasized
the importance of education, not only to individuals, but to society as a
whole. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). For a discussion of fundamental rights and the Court's criteria
for determining them, see note 33 supra.
38. 411 U.S. at 17. For a description of the rational basis test, see notes
24-29 and accompanying text supra.
39. 411 U.S. at 15-16. For the facts of Rodriguez see note 36 supra. The
Rodriguez Court stated that "[e]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the mean-

ingful exercise of [constitutionally protected fundamental rights], we have no

indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short." 411 U.S. at 36-37.
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, argued that education was a
fundamental interest. Id. at 70-133 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
reasoned that the determination of whether particular interests, not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution, were fundamental should depend on "the
extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on [those
particular] interests not mentioned in the Constitution." Id. at 102 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Marshall therefore concluded that education was a fundamental interest, entitled to heightened scrutiny, because of "the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional values."
Id. at 1.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also took issue with the
majority's assertion that equal protection challenges fall into discrete categories
which determine the appropriate level of review. Id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Court's traditional standards of review in
equal protection cases, see notes 19-35 & 56-66 and accompanying text supra.
Instead, he asserted that in the past the Court had actually applied a "slidingscale" in determining the appropriate level of review, based upon "the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification
is drawn." 411 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall originally expressed dissatisfaction with the Court's rigid
two-tiered approach in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In a
dissenting opinion, he described a three-pronged test for determining the
proper level of review, based on "the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of
the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state
interests in support of the classification." Id. at 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Court, in Graham v. Richardson,40 held that alienage is a suspect classification, 41 but alienage classifications have received varied
treatment by the Court since that time.42 Graham dealt with Arizona
and Pennsylvania statutes which conditioned eligibility for welfare benefits upon citizenship, or upon residency in the United States for a specified number of years. 43 The Court held that aliens were a suspect class,
"for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 44 The
Court rejected the states' argument that they had a "special public interest" in making their limited resources available to its citizens rather
than to aliens, 45 and therefore invalidated the statutes. 46
Two years later, however, in Sugarman v. Dougall4 7 the Court gave
notice that it was not going to subject all alienage classifications to strict
scrutiny. 48 Although in Dougall the Court did engage in a heightened
review,49 the Court stated "our scrutiny will not be so demanding where
40. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
41. For a discussion of Graham, see notes 43-46 and accompanying text
infra.

42. For a further discussion of the Court's treatment of alienage classifications in equal protection analysis, see notes 43-55 and accompanying text
infra. See generally Comment, supra note 19, at 569-74.

43. 403 U.S. at 367-70.

The Arizona statute limited assistance to those

who were United States citizens or had resided in the United States for a total

of 15 years. Id. at 367. The Pennsylvania statute limited assistance to those
needy persons who qualified for federally supported programs or who were
United States citizens. Id. at 368.
44. Id. at 372. The Graham Court stated that "[a]liens as a class are a
prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate." Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4. (1938)). For a discussion of footnote 4
in Carolene Products, see note 34 supra. This rationale has been criticized
by one commentator:
[Strict scrutiny of] alienage [classifications] must fairly be said to rest
on a judicially created notion that aliens may not be disadvantaged
because of their status as noncitizens. In light of the constitutional
provisions which specify citizenship as a requirement for eligibility,
it is difficult to say that the text and history of the Constitution require that classifications based on citizenship be treated as suspect.
Bice, supra note 19, at 695.

45. 403 U.S. at 372-76. The Court stated that concern for fiscal integrity
was not compelling enough to justify the challenged classification. Id. at 374-75
(citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). For a discussion of com-

pelling state interests, see note 32 supra.
46. 403 U.S. at 372-76. For a discussion of the statutes involved in
Graham, see note 43 and accompanying text supra.

47. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). Dougall involved a challenge to a New York
Civil Service Law that prevented non-citizens from holding competitive positions in the state civil service. Id. at 635.
48. Id. at 648. For a discussion of the development of the so-called
"Dougall exception," see notes 49-50 and accompanying text infra. For a
review of strict scrutiny as applied to alienage classifications, see notes 40-46

and accompanying text supra.
49. 413 U.S. at 642. The Court stated "classifications based on alienage
are 'subject to close judicial scrutiny.' " Id. (citing Graham v. Richardson,
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we deal with matters resting firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives." 50 Based on this exception to strict scrutiny for alienage
classifications, known as the Dougall or political function exception,51
the Court has used the rational basis test to uphold state legislation
barring non-citizens from employment as state troopers,52 public school
403 U.S. 365 (1971); Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
However, the Dougall Court required that the State's interest be substantial,
not compelling. Id. This change in language indicates that the level of the
Court's review, although heightened, was an intermediate one, and not the
strict standard called for in Graham. See generally TRIBE, suprd note 19, at
1089. For a discussion of the Court's intermediate standard of review in equal
protection analysis, see notes 56-66 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the level of review in Graham, see notes 40-46 and accompanying
text supra. The Dougall court recognized "a state's interest in establishing
its own form of government . . . in limiting participation in that government
to those who are within 'the basic conception of a political community,'"
and in defining its own political community. 413 U.S. at 642-43 (citing
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972)). Although the Dougall Court
found this interest a substantial one, it held that the state law was not "precisely drawn in light of [its] acknowledged purpose." Id. at 643. The Court
therefore found the overinclusive statute unconstitutional. Id. at 646. For a
discussion of overinclusiveness, see note 31 supra.
50. 413 U.S. at 648. In the final section of its opinion, the Court stated:
[W]e [do not] hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined
class of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office ...
Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation . . . "to
preserve the basic conception of a political community." . . . [T]his
power and responsibility of the State applies, not only to the qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for
officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or
review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart
of representative government.
Id. at 647 (citations omitted). The Court concluded with the prophecy that
"[a] restriction on the employment of noncitizens, narrowly confined, could
have particular relevance to this important state responsibility, for alienage
itself is a factor that reasonably could be employed in defining 'political
community.'" Id. at 649.
Subsequent cases continued to treat alienage classifications as inherently
suspect and thus subject to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Maucelet,
432 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating law which granted aid for higher education
only to citizens and resident aliens who were or would be applying for citizenship); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (invalidating
Puerto Rican statute which permitted only United States citizens to practice
as civil engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (invalidating state court
regulation which prevented non-citizens from taking state bar examination).
In Nyquist, the Court stated that the challenged law must further "legitimate
and substantial" state interests and that the law must be necessary and precisely drawn. 432 U.S. at 7 (quoting Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 605 (1976) and citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)).
51. For a discussion of the Dougall exception, see notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
52. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). In Foley, the Court upheld a New York statute that allowed only United States citizens to become
members of the state police force. Id. at 299-300. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§215(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978). The Court began its analysis by
stating that "we have never suggested that such legislation is inherently in-
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teachers, 53 and probation officers.5 4 The Court has also indicated that
because of federal power in the immigration area, federal legislation
impacting aliens as a class will be subject to a lesser standard of review
55
than will identical state legislation.
valid, nor have we held that all limitations on aliens are suspect." 435 U.S. at
294 (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)). For a discussion of
Dougall, see notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra. The Foley Court held
that in matters concerning a state's political process, which are "firmly within a
state's constitutional prerogative," the state need only show that the classification
bore a rational relation to the "interest sought to be protected." 435 U.S. at 296
(citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645 (1973)). For a discussion of
the rational basis test, see notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra. In
reviewing cases such as this, the Court stated it must examine the right or
interest which is being classified, "to determine whether it involves discretionary decision making, or execution of policy, which substantially affects
members of the political community." 435 U.S. at 296. The Court concluded that "[i]n short, it would be as anomalous to conclude that citizens
may be subjected to the broad discretionary powers of non-citizen police
officers as it would be to say that judicial officers and jurors with power to
judge citizens can be aliens," and, therefore, upheld the statute. Id. at 299300.
53. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). In Ambach, the Court
used the rational basis test to uphold a New York statute which limited the
issuance of teaching certificates to citizens or to non-citizens who had manifested an intention to apply for citizenship. Id. at 81. For a discussion of
the rational basis test, see notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra. The
Ambach Court likened public education to the governmental function of police
recognized in Foley, stating that both functions fulfill a "fundamental obligation of government to its constituency," and concluded that public school
teachers performed a task that went "to the heart of representative government." 441 U.S. at 75-76. In so concluding the Court emphasized the role
of public education "in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens," and the "degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in
fulfilling that role." id. at 75. Thus, public school teachers were held to
qualify as participating directly in the governmental process.
54. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S.Ct. 735, 739 (1982). In Cabell the
Court upheld a law which required probation officers to be U.S. citizens, stating
that "although citizenship is not a relevant ground for the distribution of economic benefits, it is a relevant ground for determining membership in the
political community." Id.
55. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) ("overriding
national interests may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in
the federal civil service [though] an identical requirement may not be enforced
by a State."); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (conditioning participation
in federal medicare programs on an alien's admission to the United States as a
permanent resident, and continuous residence in this country for five years,
upheld on basis of broad congressional "power over naturalization and immigration.").
There is some confusion as to whether the Court's alienage cases have been
decided on equal protection or preemption grounds. See Note, The Equal
Treatment of Aliens, supra note 18, 1069-91. This commentator argues that
despite the Court's language to the contrary, these cases were actually decided
on preemption grounds. Id. at 1070. The argument is that "as the federal
government, through the immigration scheme, 'invites' resident aliens to enter
the country as permanent residents free of restrictions-'on an equality of legal
privileges with all citizens'-it is not for the states to alter the terms of immigration with new burdens." Id. (footnote omitted). Foley and Ambach are
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The third standard of review applied by the Court, intermediate
scrutiny, requires that a challenged statute be "substantially related" to
"important governmental objectives." 56 This standard has been applied
in equal protection cases, when the interests affected are considered
important, 57 but not fundamental, and the classification in the statute
is sensitive, 5s but not suspect. The leading case applying the intermediate standard of review is Craig v. Boren.59 The Craig Court dealt
consistent with this theory; "since the federal government does not admit resident aliens to the political community-admission does not confer citizenshipthe states may exclude resident aliens from state political offices and functions
without offending federal power." Id. (emphasis supplied). This commentator
also states that "since the federal government does not admit illegal or nonimmigrant aliens to the country with any assurance of equal treatment, the
states have greater freedom to restrict these classes of aliens without infringing
on federal regulation of immigration." Id. If state classifications based on
illegal alien status are to be upheld, this commentator suggests that it must be
on a preemption basis, for they could not survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 1081.
See also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). In DeCanas, the Court dealt
with a California statute that prohibited the knowing employment of illegal
aliens. Id. at 352. The Court concluded that since the su ject matter of the
statute involved the state police power, and since there was no contrary congressional intent, the exclusive federal power to regulate immigration did not
require that this statute be preempted. Id. at 354-65.
56. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For a discussion of
Craig, see notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra. See generally Bice, supra
note 19 at 702-05. This intermediate test differs from the rational basis test
in that the interests furthered must be important, rather than simply legitimate,
and the classification must be substantially related to those interests, as opposed
to just rationally related. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Although the classification must be substantially related to an important state
interest, it need not be the least detrimental alternative. See Bice, supra note
19, at 702-03. Further, though the government's objectives must be important,
they need not be compelling. Id. at 703. One commentator describes this
"new" test as a "balancing analysis, one which weighs the importance of
governmental goals and the extent to which they are advanced against the
burdens engendered by the classification." Id. For a further discussion of
intermediate standard of review, see notes 57-66 and accompanying text infra.
57. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (interest in
eligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy); United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(food stamps); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (White, J., concurring)
(affordable tuition for higher education); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(retaining driver's license). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1089-90; Fox,
supra note 19, at 532-33.
58. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at
1090; Fox, supra 'note 19, at 533. In some cases, the Court has used an intermediate level of review when an important interest of a sensitive class has been
infringed upon. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973) (food stamps denied to households containing unrelated members); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (child custody denied to unwed
fathers). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1090-91, n.10.
59. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For a further discussion of Craig, see notes 60-62
and accompanying text infra. Craig is generally recognized and cited as the
leading intermediate scrutiny case. See Bice, supra note 19, at 702-05.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 7
1982-83]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

with a gender-based classification 60 in an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of non-intoxicating 3.2% beer to males under the age
of twenty-one, while allowing such sales to females over eighteen years
of age.61 In striking down the statute, the Court recognized the state's
important objective, traffic safety, but held that the statute was not sub62
stantially related to that purpose.

An intermediate standard of review has also recently been applied
to classifications based on illegitimacy. 63 In La li v. Lalli,64 the most
60. 429 U.S. at 191-92. In earlier years, the Court applied the rational
basis test to equal protection challenges based on gender classifications. See,
e.g., Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (deference given to legislature in
gender-based legislation). Then the Court shifted its stance, and began to
scrutinize such statutes more closely. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (rational basis test used, but gender based statute invalidated). Next,
the Court shifted its stance even further, and indicated that it would apply
strict judicial scrutiny to sex classifications. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688 (1973) ("[w]e can only conclude that classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.").
However, the Court retreated from the Frontiero position in Craig v. Boren,
and appears to have settled upon an intermediate level of scrutiny in gender
classification cases. See L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1063-66. For a further
discussion of Craig, see notes 61-62 and accompanying text infra.
61. 429 U.S. at 191-92. Reviewing the statute, the Court stated that "to
withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of these objectives." Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 199-204. The Court was skeptical of the statistical evidence
advanced by the state, but even accepting it as true, stated that "ifmaleness
is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% [of males
in the 18 to 20-year-old age group, arrested for driving while intoxicated] must
be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit.'" Id. at 201-02. The Court further
pointed out that because the statute in question only prohibited the sale of
3.2% beer to 18 to 20-year-old males, "and not their drinking the beverage once
acquired (even after purchase by their 18-20-year-old female companions), the
relationship between gender and traffic safety becomes far too tenuous." Id.
at 204 (emphasis added).
For subsequent cases applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications, see Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981);
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Personnel Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
63. See L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1057-60, 1089. In its treatment of
classifications based on illegitimacy, the Court has been both unpredictable in
its results, and inarticulate as to the degree of scrutiny it has employed. See
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 897-98. In the early
illegitimacy cases, the Court purported to apply the rational basis test. However, the varying outcomes of the cases indicate that varying degrees of
scrutiny were actually employed. Id. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968),
dealt with a law which denied to unacknowledged illegitimate children the
right to recovery for the wrongful death of a parent. The Court stated that
the rational basis test was appropriate, but nevertheless emphasized its sensi-

tivity to invidious classifications and invalidated the law. Id. at 71-72. Labine
v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), involved a law which excluded acknowledged
illegitimate children from sharing in the distribution of the parent's estate
with legitimate children. The Court applied minimal review and upheld the
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recent in this line of cases, the Court stated that classifications based on
illegitimacy must be "substantially related to permissible state interests," 6 but nevertheless upheld the challenged statute. 66
Against this background, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the
challenged Texas statute 7 violated the equal protection clause.68 The
Court began its analysis by holding for the first time that illegal aliens
are persons within the meaning of the equal protection clause, and are
thus entitled to its guarantees. 69 Relying on prior rulings which held
that illegal aliens were persons entitled to the protection of due process, 70
the Court concluded that both the due process and equal protection
law. See id. at 535-40. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972), a state workmen's compensation law which deprived illegitimate
children from recovery for the death of their father was struck down with the
Court applying a stricter scrutiny similar to that used in Levy. Id. at 167-76.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), dealt with a provision of the Social Security Act which worked to the detriment of some illegitimates. Although the
Court acknowledged that illegitimates were without fault with respect to their
status and that the Court's review was not "toothless", this provision was
upheld. Id. at 503-16. Finally, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), involved a law which barred illegitimate children from inheriting from a parent.
The Court stated that, although classifications based on illegitimacy do not
receive strict scrutiny, the review should not be "toothless," and invalidated
the law. Id. at 767-76.
64. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
65. Id. at 265.
66. Id. at 275-76. In Lalli, the challenged legislation was a New York
statute that conditioned the disposition of a father's estate to his dependents,
on the dependents' legitimacy. Id. at 261. The Court found that the statute
was substantially related to the State's "substantial" interest in maintaining the
orderly disposition of estates. Id. at 275-76.
67. For a discussion of the challenged statute, see notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
68. 102 S. Ct. 2382. Although the plaintiffs also continued to argue that
§21.031 was preempted by federal law, the Court stated it had no need to
reach this issue, in light of its holding on the equal protection issue. Id. at
2391 n.8. For a discussion of the Court's holding, see notes 69-94 and accompanying text infra. Nevertheless, the majority did treat this issue, in response
to one of the arguments made by the State. For a discussion thereof, see
notes 85-86 and accompanying text infra.
69. 102 S. Ct. at 2391. The Court rejected the State's argument that the
words "within its jurisdiction" following "person" excluded illegal aliens from
the protection of the equal protection clause. Id. For the language of the
clause, see note 16 supra. The Court responded that "[nleither our cases nor
the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment supports that constricting construction
of the phrase 'within its jurisdiction.' " 102 S. Ct. at 2392. On this point,
all nine Justices agreed. See id. at 2408 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 2391-92 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 72 (1976);
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). For
a further discussion of the Court's treatment of the term "person," see note 71
and accompanying text infra.
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clauses were meant to apply to the same classes of persons-those within
71
a state's boundaries.
The Court then faced the question of what standard of equal pro72
Initially, the Court sought
tection review to apply to the Texas law.
case constituted a suspect
this
in
plaintiffs
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to determine whether
73
comprise an "underaliens
illegal
that
acknowledging
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Although
class.
74
their status was a
that
out
pointed
Court
the
class" in our society,
not be concould
which
action,
illegal
result of their own voluntary
rejected
Court
Plyler
the
Thus,
75
sidered a "constitutional irrelevancy."
71. 102 S. Ct. at 2392. The Court concluded that both the due process
clause and the equal protection clause were intended "to protect an identical
class of persons, and to reach every exercise of State authority." Id. The
Court stated that "within its jurisdiction" simply refers to the fact that a
state can only afford equal protection of its laws where those laws operate.
Id. at 2393 (quoting Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350
(1938)). The Court rejected the State's notion that due process "is somehow
of greater stature than 'equal protection.'" Id. at 2393. The Court also referred to the legislative debate on § 1 of the fourteenth amendment, noting
that "it appears from those debates that Congress, by using the phrase 'person
within its jurisdiction,' sought expressly to ensure that the equal protection of
the laws was provided to the alien population." Id. at 2393 (citing remarks
of Rep. Bingham and Sen. Howard, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033,

1090, & 2766 (1866)).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 2395. The Court stated that although "most forms of
state action" need only bear a "fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose, . . . classifications that disadvantage a 'suspect class,' or that impinge
upon the exercise of a 'fundamental right' . . . [must be] precisely tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 2394-95 (footnotes omitted).
Furthermore, the Court stated:
[C]ertain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties;
in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the
classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of
equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as
furthering a substantial interest of the State.
Id. at 2395 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259 (1978)). For a discussion of Craig and Lalli and the different standards of
review applied to equal protection challenges by the Court, see notes 19-35
& 56-66 and accompanying text supra.
73. 102 S. Ct. 2395-97. For a discussion of suspect classes in equal pro.
tection analysis, see note 34 supra.
74. 102 S.Ct. at 2395. The Court cited the failure to enforce immigration
laws and the failure to prevent the employment of illegal aliens, as reasons
for the creation of this underclass, which is "encouraged by some to remain
here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our
society makes available to citizens and lawful residents." Id. The Court
stated that this resulted in "difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself
on adherence to principles of equality under the law." Id. at 2396.
75. Id. at 2396 n.19. The Court noted that, unlike other suspect classes,
entry into this class is both voluntary and a crime. Id. (citing DeCanas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)). For a discussion of DeCanas v. Bica, see note 55
supra.
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the plaintiffs' claim that illegal aliens constitute a suspect class.70 However, the Court stated, illegal alien children "are special members of
the underclass," 77 because "legislation directing the onus of a parent's
misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental
conceptions of justice." 78
Turning to the fundamental interest strand of equal protection
scrutiny, Justice Brennan, relying on San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,79 stated that "education was not a 'right' granted
to individuals by the Constitution." 8o However, he cautioned that
"neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare legislation." 81 The Court carefully examined the pivotal role of education in our society, and the detrimental
effects to this class of plaintiffs and on the nation in general that would
be occasioned by a denial of education.8 2 These factors, combined with
76. 102 S. Ct. at 2396 n.19, 2398.
77. Id. at 2396. The Court stated the children were special because they
could "affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Id. (citing
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). The Court emphasized that the
Texas statute imposed its "discriminatory burden" upon children who, like
illegitimate children, were placed in a classification without fault of their own.
Id. at 2397. For a discussion of Trimble and the Court's analysis of il-

legitimacy classifications in equal protection analysis, see notes 63-66 and
accompanying text supra.
78. 102 S.Ct. at 2396 (citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972)). As a result, the Court stated that it had difficulty perceiving

a rational justification for punishing these children "for their presence" in the
country, yet this was "precisely the effect" of the Texas statute. Id. at 2397.
79. For a discussion of Rodriguez, see notes 36-39 and accompanying text
supra.

80. 102 S.Ct. at 2397. Justice Brennan noted that since education is not
a right guaranteed by the Constitution, it cannot be considered fundamental
for equal protection analysis. Id. at 2398. For a discussion of fundamental
rights, see note 33 supra.
81. 102 S. Ct. at 2397. The Court went on to state that "[b]oth the
importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting
impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction." Id.
82. Id. at 2397-98. The majority stressed its belief that education is vital
to the maintenance of the democratic system and to effective participation in
the system by its citizens. Id. (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)).

In addition, the majority further noted the handi-

capping effect of a lack of education upon an individual, and "the significant
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to
absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests." 102 S. Ct. at
2397. The Court stated that a denial of education also affronted the equal
protection clause by "presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the
basis of individual merit." Id. The Court concluded that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." Id. at 2398
(quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). Thus, the

majority viewed education to be an important, though not a fundamental right.
Id. For discussions of fundamental and important rights in equal protection
analysis, see notes 33 & 57 supra.
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the special status of these plaintiffs, 8 3 led the Court to adopt a heightened
level of review; the Texas statute would be upheld only if it furthered
"some substantial goal of the State."
84
In reviewing the challenged statute under this test, the Plyler Court
first rejected the argument of the State that the illegality of the plaintiffs' entry into this country estabished "a sufficient rational basis" for
denying educational benefits.ss The state argued that its education law
was in harmony with federal policy in the treatment of illegal aliens,
but the Court found that it was not.86 Setting aside this argument, the
Court discerned "three colorable state interests" that might arguably be
advanced by the legislation.8 7 First, the Court stated that the statute
could not be supported by an assertion that it protected the state from
an influx of illegal immigrants 88 because there was no evidence presented which showed that illegal aliens actually imposed a substantial
83. 102 S. Ct. at 2396-98. For a discussion of the special status of these
plaintiffs, see notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 2398. For the majority's discussion of the different levels
of scrutiny possible in equal protection cases, see note 72 supra. For a review
of the standards generally used by the Court in this context, see notes 19-35
& 56-66 and accompanying text supra.
85. 102 S. Ct. at 2398-99. In a footnote, the majority conceded that the
State's argument would have been virtually unanswerable if the "guarantee
of equal protection was available only to those upon whom Congress affirmatively granted its benefit." Id. at 2398 n.21. Having found that it was not,
the Court determined whether Congress' disapproval of the presence of these
children in the United States aided the state in the defense of its statute.
Id. at 2398-99.
86. Id. at 2398-99. The Court indicated that a state's power to act with
respect to illegal aliens was limited to situations in which "such action mirrors
federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal." Id. at 2399 (citing
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)). The Court stated that Congress had
made it possible to deport illegal aliens and to grant them relief from deportation through legal alien status or citizenship. Id. However, the Court
was "reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to withhold from these
children, so long as they are present in this country through no fault of their
own, access to a basic education." Id. For a discussion of the doctrine of
preemption as applied to alienage classifications, see note 55 supra.
In addition, the Court likewise rejected the state's argument that the
statute furthered fiscal conservation of the state's resources for lawful residents.
102 S. Ct. at 2400. The majority stated that "a concern for the preservation
of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in
allocating those resources." Id. (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
374-75 (1971). For a discussion of Graham and state interests that are not
considered compelling for the purposes of equal protection analysis, see note
32 supra.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 2400. For the Court's treatment of these three interests,
see notes 88-92 and accompanying text infra.
88. 102 S. Ct. at 2400. The Court conceded that a state might, in certain
circumstances have a legitimate interest in protecting itself from the
"potentially harsh economic effects of sudden shifts of population." However,
such interests must conform with Congressional intent. Id. at n.23 (citing
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-56 (1976)).
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burden on the state's economy.8 9 The Court reasoned further that,
even if this were the case, charging tuition to illegal alien children was
an ineffective means to carry out this purposeY° Secondly, the Court
rejected the argument that these children were properly singled out for
exclusion because of the extra costs and burdens they impose on the
educational system. 91 Finally, the Court similarly rejected the notion
that illegal alien children were appropriate for exclusion because their
unlawful status made them less likely than other children to remain
within the state or to put their education to productive use within
92
the state.
The Court thus concluded that to deny to this "discrete group of
innocent children" 93 the public educational opportunities available to
other children in the state was not. justified by any substantial state
interest, and that the challenged statute, therefore, violated the equal
94
protection clause.
Justice Marshall, in a concurrence, stated that he joined the opinion
of the Court,9 5 "without in any way retreating" from his assertion in
his Rodriguez dissent 96 that education is a fundamental interest. 97 In
89. 102 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court noted that, to the contrary, illegal
aliens pay taxes and contribute their labor to the local economy, while usually
underutilizing public services. Id.
90. Id. The Court agreed with the findings of the lower courts, that
illegal aliens enter the United States seeking work, not to get a free public
education for their children, and that the unavailability of education would
be ineffective in curtailing the entry of undocumented aliens. Id. at 2401 n.24.
For a discussion of the district court and circuit court opinions, see notes
13-14 and accompanying text supra.
91. 102 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court noted that there was no evidence in
the record that the exclusion of these children would be "likely to improve
the overall quality of education in the state." Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 458
F. Supp. at 577). Further, even if there was such evidence presented, the
Court stated that "the State must support its selection of this group as the
appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need,
however, undocumented children are 'basically indistinguishable' from legally
resident alien children." Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 589).
92. 102 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court noted that the state had no guarantee
that any child would use his education productively within state borders, and
that, in any event, many of these children will remain inside this country,
some even becoming citizens of the United States. Id. at 2401-02.
93. Id. at 2402.
94. Id. The Court concluded as follows:
It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve
by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates
within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of
unemployment, welfare and crime. It is thus clear that whatever
savings might be achieved by denying these children an education,
they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these

children, the State, and the Nation.
Id. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
95. 102 S. Ct. at 2402 (Marshall, J., concurring).
96. Id. For a discussion of Justice Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez, see
note 39 supra.
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addition, he continued to recommend that the Court do away with its
"rigidified approach to equal protection analysis" in favor of a "sliding
scale" approach that would allow for different levels of judicial scrutiny,
depending upon the importance of the interest affected, and the "invidiousness" of the classification. 98
Justice Blackmun wrote separately to discuss the special nature of
the interest involved-education. 99 While noting that he continued to
agree with the rule in Rodriguez that fundamental interests are those
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," "Oo Justice
Blackmun asserted that this rule would not satisfactorily settle every
fundamental rights issue arising under the equal protection clause. 10 1
He likened the right to education to the right to vote, 102 which has
been afforded stringent constitutional protection by the Court, stating
that a complete denial of education must be justified by "more than a
rational basis." 103 Justice Blackmun therefore concluded that the Texas
97. 102 S. Ct. at 2402 (Marshall, J., concurring). Education, in Justice
Marshall's view, is a fundamental interest because of its unique status in our
country, and because of the "close relationship between education and some
of our most basic constitutional values."

Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep.

School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of Rodriguez, see notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
98. 102 S. Ct. at 2402 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
For a discussion of Justice Marshall's dissents in Rodriguez and Dandridge,
see note 39 supra.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2402 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 2403 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 33-34). For a discussion of Rodriguez, see notes 36-39 and accompanying
text supra.
101. 102 S.Ct. at 2403 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun maintained
that his position was consistent With Rodriguez, stating that Rodriguez did not
hold that there are no meaningful distinctions to be made "among the multitude of social and political interests regulated by the States," but rather that
"'Rodriguez implicitly acknowledged that certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special place in equal protection
analysis." Id.
102. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that, like the right to education, the
right to vote is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. Id. See note
33 supra. He stated that, nevertheless, a denial of the right to vote relegates
an individual to "second-class social statuts," just as a denial of an education
similarly places an individual at a "permanent political disadvantage." 102
S. Ct. at 2404 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Therefore, the denial of education,

like the denial of the right to vote, "creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent" with the purposes of the equal protection clause. Id.
103. 102 S.Ct. at 2403 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966)). For a review of those fundamental rights and interests protected by

the Court, which are not explicitly guaranteed by the constitution, see note

33 supra.
In addition, Justice Blackmun noted that in Rodriguez the Court "reserved
judgment on the constitutionality of a state system that 'occasioned an absolute
denial of educational opportunities to any of its children.' " 102 S.Ct. at 2404
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statute was "unconstitutional as well as unwise." 104
Justice Powell also joined the Court, and wrote a concurring
opinion, in which he admonished the federal government for its poor
control over immigration, 05 but stated nonetheless that these illegal
alien children "should not be left on the streets uneducated." "06 Justice
Powell emphasized that the use of heightened scrutiny was proper in
cases such as this, in which the affected parties were classified on the
basis of a characteristic over which they had no control. 107 He concluded that the Texas statute bore "no substantial relation to any sub08
stantial state interest" and must, therefore, be overturned.
(Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion of this aspect of Rodriguez, see
note 39 supra. He chose not to label education a fundamental right, but
stated in a footnote that: "[s]ince the statute fails to survive [the majority's]
level of scrutiny . . . there is no need to determine whether a more probing
level of review would be appropriate." 102 S. Ct. at 2404 n.3 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
Justice Blackmun also emphasized the preemption issue, noting the inconsistency between the Texas statute's absolute ban on education and the fact
that the statute affected "children who will in fact, and who may well be entitled to, remain in the United States." Id. at 2405 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104. 102 S. Ct. at 2405 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2405-08 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell criticized
Congress for failing to provide "effective leadership in dealing with this problem." Id. at 2405 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). As a result, he
expressed sympathy for the "exasperation of responsible citizens and government authorities in Texas and other states similarly situated. Their responsibility, if any, for the influx of aliens is slight compared to that imposed by the
Constitution on the federal government." Id. at 2407 (Powell, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted). Justice Powell further suggested that the federal government be held responsible for the added costs incurred in educating these
children, stating that "[s]o long as the ease of entry remains inviting, and the
power to deport is exercised infrequently by the federal government, the additional expense of admitting these children to public schools might fairly be
shared by the federal and state governments." Id. at 2407-08 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
106. Id. at 2406 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated that despite
Texas' conceded problem with illegal immigration, "it can hardly be argued
rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of whom will remain in the State, adding to the
problems and costs of both State and National Governments attendant upon
unemployment, welfare and crime." id. at 2408 (Powell, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 2406 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated, as follows:
The classification at issue deprives a group of children of the opportunity for education afforded all other children simply because they
have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by their
parents. These children thus have been singled out for a lifelong
penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the
creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be
reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. (emphasis added). However, Justice Powell emphasized that he agreed
with the 'Court's holding, that strict scrutiny was not appropriate in cases
which did not involve a "fundamental constitutional right or a suspect classification." Id. at n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 2406-07 (Powell, J., concurring).
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A strong dissent, written by Chief Justice Burger, criticized the
majority for overstepping the Court's constitutional bounds and departing from settled constitutional principles in an attempt to "make amends
for the default of others." 109 The dissent accused the majority of
taking a "result-oriented" approach and creating a "custom-tailored"
theory of review which "applies only when illegal alien children are
deprived of public education." 110 Chief Justice Burger stated that
neither the lack of culpability "I on the part of the children nor the
importance of education 112 were sufficient to warrant heightened scrutiny
of this statute. 113 The dissent would have required only that the Texas
statute bear "a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose," 114
and found that the statute should, on that basis, be upheld. 115
109. Id. at 2408-09 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices White, Rehnquist
and O'Connor joined the Chief Justice in dissent. For a discussion of the
Court's traditional analysis in equal protection cases, see notes 19-35 & 56-66
and accompanying text supra. Although he stated that he personally did not
favor the statute, Chief Justice Burger claimed that it was not the province of
the Court to invalidate laws under the equal protection clause simply "because
they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, 'wisdom', or 'common
sense' " or because another branch of government, the legislature, has acted
slowly and inefficiently. 102 S. Ct. at 2408 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger stated that "[t]he dispositive issue in these cases, simply put, is
whether, for purposes of allocating its finite resources, a State has a legitimate
reason to differentiate between persons who are lawfully within the State and
those who are unlawfully there." Id. at 2409 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
110. 102 S. Ct. at 2409 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
called the Court's analysis, "quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights."
Id. For a discussion of suspect classes, fundamental rights, and the Court's
traditional standards of equal protection review, see notes 19-35 & 56-66 and
accompanying text supra.
111. 102 S. Ct. at 2410 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
claimed that "the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude legislators from
classifying among persons on the basis of factors and characteristics over which
individuals may be said to lack 'control,' " such as "ill health, need for public
assistance, or place of residence." Id. at 2409 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger also distinguished this classification from illegitimacy, stating
that membership in an illegal alien classification was not due to the member's
"status of birth," but rather to his continuing illegal presence in this country.
Id. at 2410 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). The dissent stated that education, despite its importance, is not a "'fundamental right' for purposes of
equal protection analysis." Id. Chief Justice Burger queried whether education is more fundamental than other governmental benefits, such as "food,
shelter, or medical care," and, if so, how it is to be distinguished from those
other government entitlements. Id.
113. Id. For a discussion of the majority's standard of review, see notes
72-84 and accompanying text supra.
114. 102 S.Ct. at 2411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). For
a discussion of the traditional rational basis test applied in equal protection
analysis, see notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
115. 102 S.Ct. at 2411-14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters claimed
that conservation of state revenues was not "per se an illegitimate goal," and
stated "it simply is not 'irrational' for a State to conclude that it does not
have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose very presence
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Reviewing the Court's decision, it is submitted that although the
Court's holding was, in the words of the dissent, "custom-tailored" to
the facts of this case,"16 it was nevertheless an appropriate application
of heightened equal protection scrutiny."17 First, the Court properly
construed the equal protection clause as extending to all persons, illegal
aliens or otherwise.118 Secondly, the interest here affected-educationis so vitally important to the role of an individual in a democracy and
to the success of a democratic society as a whole "19 that it deserves the
Court's utmost protection. 2 0 Finally, the nature of the class involved
in Plyler also warrants a heightened level of scrutiny. This classification
affects children who are both involuntary and illegal residents of the
United States. As such, state legislation aimed at this "underclass" should
be afforded a blend of the scrutiny traditionally utilized in alienage classifications 121 and the intermediate level of scrutiny applied to classificain the State and this country is illegal as it does to provide for persons lawfully present." Id. at 2412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent drew support from the fact that "the federal government has seen fit to exclude illegal
aliens from numerous social welfare programs," such as food stamps and
medicaid. Id. at 2413 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized
the majority for apparently requiring the state to show that barring these
children from public schools would "improve the quality of education provided
in those schools," stating that a similar showing is not required in laws barring
medicaid to illegal aliens. Id.
The dissent concluded by stating that the Court's decision threatened
separation of powers principles. Id. at 2414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger concluded that "the Court seeks to do Congress' job for it,
compensating for congressional inaction. It is not unreasonable to think that
this encourages the political branches to pass their problems to the judiciary."
Id.

116. Id. at 2409 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of Chief
Justice Burger's dissent, see notes 109-15 and accompanying text supra.
117. For the standard enunciated by the Court, see notes 83-84 and accompanying text supra. Although the Court labeled its review intermediate
scrutiny, it is submitted that the Court's review was very close to strict scrutiny.
The unremitting language of the Court in its evaluation of the state's interests,
indicates that the State of Texas could not have made any showing which
would have satisfied the Court that §21.031 furthered a substantial state interest. For a discussion of the Court's rejection of the purposes advanced by
the state, see notes 85-92 and accompanying text supra.
118. See 102 S. Ct. at 2392. In so doing, the Court has simply ruled that
equal protection and due process clauses are coextensive. For a discussion of
the Court's treatment of the term "person" in equal protection and due
process clause cases, see notes 17 & 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
119. See 102 S. Ct. at 2397-98; id. at 2402 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at
2404 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a review of the treatment of education by
the Supreme Court, see notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the treatment of education in the Plyler majority and concurring
opinions, see notes 79-82 & 95-104 and accompanying text supra.
120. For a further discussion of the proper treatment to be afforded education in equal protection analysis, see notes 126-28 and accompanying text
infra.
121. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of alienage classifications in
equal protection analysis, see notes 40-54 and accompanying text supra.
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tions, such as gender 122 and illegitimacy, 23 whose members can exercise
no control over their membership in the dass.124
An examination of the Court's analysis, however, reveals that there
is no clear indication as to which aspect, the interest affected or the
class involved, carried the most weight with the majority. 12 It is submitted that the primary reason for the Court's use of heightened intermediate scrutiny in this case was the total deprivation of education
occasioned by the statute. 20
The majority and the three concurring
opinions all placed heavy emphasis upon the importance of education
in our society. 127 In fact, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, although
122. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of gender based classifications
in equal protection analysis, see notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
123. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of classifications based on
illegitimacy, see notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
124. See 102 S. Ct. at 2396-97. For a further discussion of the majority's
treatment of this "underclass," see notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
Curiously, the Court never mentions that it has ever given aliens strict scrutiny;
the Court simply states that the plaintiffs' illegal status is not a "constitutional
irrelevancy." 102 S. Ct. at 2396 n.19. Instead the Court refers to illegal
aliens as an underclass, and these plaintiffs as "children who are special members of this underclass," who are blameless with respect to being in this country
illegally. Id. at 2396. Thus, their status is similar to that of illegitimates, for
which the Court has applied the intermediate standard of review. Id. Whether
or not this indicates a heightened intermediate scrutiny for all classifications
which affect children, is unclear. For a further discussion of the Court's treatment of classifications based on illegitimacy, see notes 63-66 and accompanying
text supra.
125. It is submitted that the Court's decision leaves some important questions unanswered with regard to its choice of the level of review. Was the
use of intermediate scrutiny based entirely on the interest involved? If so,
what does the discussion about the class affected add? Or, does the Court's
analysis turn on the class of illegal alien children who are classified on the
basis of a status over which they have no control? For a discussion of these
questions, see notes 126-28 and accompanying text infra.
126. For the text of the challenged statute, and a discussion of its effect,
see notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra. The Court declined the opportunity to declare education a fundamental interest, a question arguably left
open by the Court in Rodriguez. For a discussion of the Rodriguez decision
see notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Plyler
Court's treatment of the interest in education, see notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the Court's refusal to label education
fundamental, actually reflects a desire to avoid future litigation involving
what quantum, quality, or degree of education is required under the equal
protection clause, rather than a belief that education is not a fundamental
interest. However, now having accorded heightened scrutiny to what is labeled
an "important" interest, the Court will soon face the chore of differentiating
education from various other "important" interests, such as food, housing or
medical care. This is due, in part, to the Court's failure to clearly indicate
the degree of influence exerted by the class, or the interest, or both, on its
holding. For a discussion of the Court's analysis on this aspect, see note 125
and accompanying text supra.
127. For a review of the treatment of education in the majority and concurring opinions, see notes 79-82 - 95-104 and accompanying text supra.
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joining in the majority- opinion, both wrote separately to discuss the
"special place in equal protection analysis" to be accorded education. 128
It is suggested that the Court's failure to articulate a precise basis
for its holding stems from the obvious difficulty that arises from attempting to force a spectrum of facts, rights, and interests into discrete and
rigid standards of review. 129 The language used by the Justices in their
30
It
opinions reveals confusion over just what these standards entail.1
is submitted that with at least three, and possibly more, different standards of equal protection review,' 81 the Court's use of Justice Marshall's
"sliding scale" is now apparent, and should be formally acknowledged. 18 2
128. 102 S. Ct. at 2403 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

Justice Marshall's

concurrence dealt explicitly with his belief that education is a fundamental

interest. Id. at 2402 (Marshall, J., concurring). He did not discuss the status
of class affected. Id. Justice Blackmun emphasized that it was the importance
of education which allowed the Court to apply a heightened review, likening
education to the right to vote,' and finding this consistent with Rodriguez.
Id.'at 2402-05 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a further discussion of these
concurrences, see notes 95-10-4 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion
of Rodriguez, see notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
Despite the great deal of emphasis placed on the "underclass" plaintiffs
by the rest of the majority, it is submitted that the Court would be unwilling
to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to legislation affecting. other nonfundamental rights, since the four member dissent refused to engage in
heightened scrutiny and two members of the majority wrote separately to emphasize the special nature of education. See 102 S. Ct. at 2402 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 2402-05 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2410-11 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970).
129. See 102 S. Ct. at 2403 (Blackmun, J, concurring). Justice Blackmun
stated, "I believe the Court's experience has demonstrated that the Rodriguez
formulation does not settle every issue of 'fundamental rights' arising under
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. For a discussion of Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion, see notes 99-104 and accompanying text supra. See also
102 S. Ct. at 2402 (Marshall, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion, see notes 95-98 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Rodriguez, see notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
130. For Justice Powell, the statute must bear a "substantial relation,"
while the majority opinion required only that the statute further a substantial
state interest. 102 S. Ct. at 2398; id. at 2406 (Powell, J., concurring). While
both opinions conclude that § 21.031 failed to meet their respective tests, it appears Justice Powell would have required a stronger showing of the relationship
between the statute and the state interest. Justice Blackmun concludes that
Texas "must offer something more than a rational basis for its classification,"
finding no need to be more specific since the statute failed the majority's test.
Id. at 2404, & n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Marshall continued to
adhere to his "sliding scale" approach. For a discussion of Justice Marshall's
"sliding scale," see note 39 supra and note 132 infra. For a discussion of
the majority and concurring opinions, see notes 67-108 and accompanying
text supra.
131. For a discussion of the standards of review that have been recognized
by the Court, see notes 19-35 & 56-66 and accompanying text supra.
. 132. Applying the "sliding scale," the "importance of the interest adversely
affected, [education], and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

It is additionally submitted, that the Court has now created another
exception to the already varied treatment accorded to classifications of
non-citizens, 183 by labeling the children of illegal aliens special members
of an underclass, and asserting that state legislation affecting them be
184
accorded intermediate scrutiny.
As a result of the unique facts of this case, and the Court's dual
reliance on both the class affected and the interest involved,13 5 it is
difficult to discern how its holding will apply beyond these facts. 36
Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the Court has extended the
equal protection of the laws to illegal aliens 13T and that it has elevated
the particular classification [was] drawn, [illegal alien children]," warranted
the Court's use of heightened judicial scrutiny. See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For a further discussion of Justice Marshall's sliding scale analysis in equal
protection analysis, see note 39 and accompanying text supra. However, since
the four dissenting justices (Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor) adhere to rigid two-tier scrutiny, with no possibility for variation no matter how meritorious the claim, this does not appear
to be imminent. See 102 S. Ct. at 2408-14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Still,
it is becoming increasingly difficult to place the Court's decisions into separate
and neat standards of review.
133. See 102 S.Ct. at 2395-98. Previously, a statute which classified persons
on the basis of legal alienage received strict scrutiny, unless the challenged
law was construed as an exercise of the state's prerogative under the political
function exception, or was preempted by federal law. In these latter cases,
the appropriate standard of review is the rational basis test. The Court has
also applied this deferential standard of review to federal legislation affecting
aliens. For a discussion of the treatment of alienage classifications under equal
protection analysis, see notes 40-54 and accompanying text supra. Plyler has
proven to be an interesting counterpoint to the Court's decision in Ambach.
In Ambach, the Court determined that a State's regulation of public school
teachers on the basis of nationality came within the ambit of the political
function exception first articulated in Dougall. The Plyler decision points out
that, although the state has great latitude in determining who may teach, it
may not exercise the same discretion in determining who may be taught. This
result was presaged by the Court's decision in Nyquist, which similarly rejected
an attempt by a State to regulate its students' eligibility for financial aid, based
on alienage. For a discussion of Ambach, see note 53 supra. For a discussion
of Dougall, see notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
Nyquist, see note 50 supra.
134. 102 S.Ct. at 2396. For a discussion of this special "underclass", see
notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra. For a review of the Court's treatment of these children plaintiffs, see notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra.
135. For a discussion of this aspect of the Court's analysis, see notes 72-84
and accompanying text supra.
136. For a review of the facts involved in Plyler, see notes 1-12 and accompanying text supra.
137. 102 S.Ct. at 2391-94. For a discussion of the Court's interpretation
of the equal protection clause as protecting illegal aliens, see notes 67-71 and
accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss1/7

26

Gallagher: Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - A Texas Statute Which Wit
VILLANOVA -LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 28: p. 198

education to a new height in equal protection scrutiny.38s However, so
long as disagreement among the justices persists with respect to the
proper level of scrutiny to be afforded, practitioners will find it difficult
to frame equal protection arguments for the Court.18 9
Michael P. Gallagher
138. For a review of the Plyler Court's treatment of education, see notes
79-82 and accompanying text supra.
This elevated treatment, however, may be limited to absolute deprivations
of education, since the Court still embraces its holding in Rodriguez. See 102
S. Ct. at 2397. See also 102 S. Ct. at 2403-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
139. For a discussion of the various levels of scrutiny applied by the Court in
equal protection analysis, see notes 19-35 k 56-66 and accompanying text supra.
In addition to the uncertainty in equal protection analysis, there is still the
specter of the preemption issue haunting the Court. Although the majority
stated that it did not reach this issue, it did deal with it, and Justices Powell

and Blackmun also treated it in their concurrences.

For a discussion of pre-

emption in the majority and concurring opinions, see notes 85-86 & 105 and
accompanying text supra, and
note 103 supra.
For a discussion of preemption
text supra.
generally, see note 55 and accompanying
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